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Abstract 
 
We present a model of a currency area in which labor markets of country members are isolated 
but there is trade among these countries. When a country experiences a negative (resp. positive) 
shock, inflation goes down (up). This causes two effects. On the one hand the real interest rate of 
this country increases (decreases). On the other hand the goods produced in this country become 
more (less) competitive. We show that the stability of the system depends on several factors, 
including a large competitive effect, how inflation expectations are formed and fiscal policy. In 
general, stability requires a trade-off between the rationality of expectations and budget balance. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In a currency area, compensating the effect of an idiosyncratic shock on a 
member country by adjusting its exchange rate is no longer an option. The 
literature recognizes several factors that may take the role of exchange rate: 
factor mobility (Mundell [1961]), price/wage flexibility (Friedman [1953], 
Kawai [1987]), fiscal federalism (Kennen [1969]) and trade among member 
countries (McKinnon [1963]). The latter effect arises either from income or 
inflation rate differentials2. In this note we concentrate on the second effect. 
The conjecture is that such effect stabilizes the economies in the currency area 
because if a country experiences, say, a positive shock, its inflation rate goes 
up, decreasing the competitiveness of this country and neutralizing the initial 
effect (Alesina et al. [2001] pp. 18-19). We call this the competitive effect. 
However, when the rate of inflation goes up, the real interest rate 
decreases. This effect goes in opposite direction to the competitive effect 
because it stimulates the economy of the country that has experienced a 
positive shock. We call this the real interest effect.  
In this note we provide a simple model to study the working of both 
effects. We assume two countries and that all relevant functions are linear. An 
interpretation of the latter assumption is that we study the economy in a 
neighbourhood of the (unique) stationary equilibrium. We also assume that the 
only difference between countries is the size of potential output. Public 
expenditure is, either constant or tuned in order to offset inflation.  The central 
bank only cares about maintaining a constant average inflation. We show that 
if the central bank attains its target, the nominal interest rate is constant 
(Lemma 1).  
                                                 
2 The early literature focussed on price levels, not on inflation rates. 
  3 
We identify a range of parameters for which equilibrium is stable 
(Proposition 1). It turns out that without an activist fiscal policy, these values 
are not very reasonable. In particular, expectations in equilibrium cannot be 
rational. This is due to the fact that the competitive effect does not work if 
agents anticipate correctly inflation because in this case supply becomes 
totally inelastic. Moreover, it might be that a country is gaining share in 
international markets even if its inflation is rising if this inflation is lower than 
the inflation of its partners. In other words, a country receiving a positive 
shock has a rising inflation, but not necessarily a relatively high inflation.3  
The rest of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 describes the model and 
analyzes the dynamic trajectories. Section 3 gathers our conclusions.  
 
 
2: THE MODEL 
 
Time is continuous. All variables are assumed to be twice continuously 
differentiable with respect to time. A dot above a variable represents its 
derivative with respect to time. Two dots indicate a second derivative. 
There are two countries denoted by j = 1, 2. Let Yjn be the potential 
income of country j. Let λ and 1- λ be the relative size of the potential income 
of countries 1 and 2, i.e. 
 
(1 - λ ) Yn1 = λ Yn2 [1] 
 
Countries are assumed to be identical except for the scale factor λ. 
                                                 
3 If inflation is rising in a country, eventually, it will catch up to the inflation in the other country. However, at 
this point, potential output is different from real output (except in exceptional cases). Therefore the equality 
between inflation rates will not persist, producing a cycle. See our comments at the end of Section 2. 
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The income of j, denoted by Yj, is the sum of consumption, investment, 
public expenditure, denoted by Gj and net exports denoted by Sj. Investment is 
an affine function of the real interest rate, denoted by rj. Consumption is affine 
on income net of taxes. Taxes are affine on income. Thus, 
 
Yj =  Fj – Bj rj + Cj Sj + Dj Gj,      Fj, Bj , Cj , Dj, > 0.  [2] 
 
This is the usual IS curve. Taking units, D1 = D2 = 1. Since countries are 
identical except for the scale factor, C1 = C2 = C, say, and the relative impact 
of the interest rate on output equals the relative size of this country, i.e. (1 - λ) 
B1 = λ B2. If i is the nominal interest rate and πej is the expected rate of 
inflation of country j, rj ≡ i - πej. Expectations are formed according to 
 
πej = a πj – b πj   a > 0. [3] 
 
Thus, if the inflation rate is constant and a = 1 we have perfect foresight. 
From [3] we get πje = a πj – b πj. 
        The supply side is modelled by a Phillips curve with expectations, i.e. 
      
(Yj – Yjn)              
       πj = β  + πej . Letβj ≡ β/Yjn . Then,                                         
                       Yjn 
       
πj = βj(Y1 – Yjn) + πej [4] 
 
Notice thatβj(Yjn -Y1) =  πej - πj = (a – 1) πj – b  πj . Therefore if a ≈ 1, b 
< 0 is absurd because it implies that when real output is above potential 
output, the inflation rate is decreasing. Thus, from now on we assume b > 0. 
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Net exports are assumed to be  
 
P2 
S1 = Q Ln ()α , Q > 0, α > 0. 
P1 
 
where Pj is the price in j. Clearly, S1 = - S2. When prices are identical in 
both countries, S1 = 0. Setting K ≡ Q α, we obtain  
 
S1= K (π2 - π1) [5] 
 
National fiscal authorities implement fiscal policies to stabilize their 
respective economies in such a way that the variation in public expenditure is 
linear on the rate of change of inflation.4 
 
 Gj = - δj πj,         δj ≥ 0,          (1 - λ) δ1 = λ δ2.                                       [6]    
 
Finally, we assume that the central bank stabilizes weighted average 
inflation, denoted byπ and defined asπ ≡ λ π1 + (1 - λ) π2.  
   
Lemma:  If average inflation is constant, the nominal interest rate is constant. 
 
Proof: Plugging [2] and [4] in the definition ofπ, 
 
π = λ{β1[F1 – B1(i - π1e) + CS1 + G1 – Yn1] + π1e} +  
  + (1 - λ){β2[F2 – B2(i - π2e)- CS1 + G2  – Yn2] + π2e}   
 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we disregard boundary problems associated with the non-negativity of public expenditure. 
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Differentiating with respect to time and rearranging. 
 
πe1[λ(β1B1+1)]+πe2[(1-λ)(β2B2+1)]+CS1[λβ1-(1-λ)β2]λβ1G1+(1-λ)β2G2 
i =    
λβ1B1+ (1 - λ)β2B2 
 
Using [3], [5] and [6] 
 
π1aλ[β1(B1 - δ1) -β2(B2 - δ2)] - π1bλ(β1B1 -β2B2)+K[(π - π1)/(1-λ)]C[λβ1-(1-λ)β2] 
i = -  
λβ1B1 + (1 - λ)β2B2 
 
Thus, under our assumptions,  i = 0.  
 
From now on we assume that the central bank achieves its objective. 
Plugging [2] and [3] in [4], 
 
 π1 (β1B1 + 1)b = π1 [(β1B1 + 1)a – 1] + β1 (F1 – B1i + CS1 + G1 – Yn1)  
 
Differentiating wrt time and using [5], [6] and the definition ofπ we get 
 
 (π - π1) 
π1 (β1B1 + 1)b = π1 [(β1B1 + 1)a - β1δ1 – 1]+ β1CK  [7] 
(1 - λ) 
 
λ 
π2 = -    π1 [8] 
  (1 - λ) 
 
Clearly, if [7] is solved, [8] is solved too. Therefore let us solve [7]. 
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Proposition 1: If a < (1 + β1δ1) /(β1B1 + 1) and the competitive effect 
is large enough, the trajectory of the rate of inflation of country 1 is stable. 
Proof: [7] can be written as  π1 + d1 π1 +d2 π1t = D where 
 
    (β1B1 + 1)a – 1 - β1δ1 
 d1  ≡ -    
   (β1B1 + 1) b 
 
 β1CK  
d2  ≡   
  (β1B1 + 1) b (1 - λ) 
  
This is a differential equation whose particular integral is found by 
setting π1 = π1 = 0. [7] implies that at this point, π1 = π. To obtain the 
trajectory we solve the quadratic equation z2 + d1z +d2 = 0, i.e. 
 
- d1 ± √d12 – 4d2 
z =   
2 
 
The system is stable if both roots are negative. We have three cases. 
1) If d12 > 4d2, the roots, say , z1 and z2, are two real numbers, z1 ≠ z2. 
Stability requires -d1 ± √d12 – 4d2 < 0; i.e. d2 < 0; this condition never holds 
because d2 is positive. Thus, the system is unstable and the inflation rate 
diverges from the stationary equilibrium. 
2) If d12 = 4d2, both roots take the same value, z1 = z2 = - d1/2. Stability 
requires d1 > 0 which is equivalent to a < (1 + β1δ1)/(β1B1 + 1). 
3) If d12 < 4d2, both roots are imaginary. For this case to arise, the 
competitive effect (i.e. CK) has to be large. In this case the system describes a 
  8 
cyclic path. For equilibrium to be stable, i.e. for diminishing amplitude in 
cycle, we need d1 > 0, or, equivalently, a < (1 + β1δ1)/(β1B1 + 1).  
Notice that if we have only the competitive effect (δ1 = δ2 = B1 = B2 = 0), 
the sufficient condition for convergence is a < 1. If a = 1 the trajectory is an 
orbit. Under no fiscal policy (δ1 = δ2 = 0), the condition is a < 1 /(β1B1 + 1). 
In both cases stability requires some myopia in the perception of the changes 
in the rate of inflation (if expectations are quickly revised a ≈ 1). But if fiscal 
authorities choose δ1 such that d21 ≤ 4d2 and a < (1 + β1δ1)/(β1B1 + 1), 
inflation rates converge to the stationary equilibrium. This highlights the 
importance of fiscal policy in order to attain convergence. 
 
 
3: CONCLUSION 
 
In this note we have studied the stability of a currency area where shocks 
are compensated by trade among country members. In our model a large 
competitive effect is necessary but not sufficient for convergence. In absence 
of fiscal policy, stability also requires expectations not rational at the steady 
state (i.e. a < 1). If this condition fails, fiscal policy becomes necessary for 
convergence. Needless to say, the robustness of this conclusion must be 
checked in more general models (more than two countries, asymmetries, non-
linear functions). Other suggestions for further research are: 
1: In a currency area investment in a country may depend on the 
differential of real interest rates, i.e. on the differential of inflation rates.  
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2: It would be interesting to know more about fiscal rules. In particular 
about the existence of a rule that stabilizes the economy and in which deficits 
and surpluses produced during the stabilization process cancel out.  
3: Perhaps our model can shed some light on the divergent behavior of 
some countries in the EMU in recent years, particularly Germany and Spain. 
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